picuinhices… ou da diferença entre pedido e indicação

Há alguma falta de senso linguístico que me “faz espécie”. Por exemplo, quando se toma uma indicação por um pedido.  Alguém indica um forma de fazer alguma coisa e no email seguinte lê-se «a pedido de», quando se devia poder ler «por indicação de». Eu sei que pode parecer uma picuinhice mas, em boa verdade, parece(-me) incapacidade de diferenciar, de estabelecer aquelas distinções simples como entre pedir e indicar.

Um pedido significa que se pediu, um rogo ou súplica, que se apresentou uma necessidade, uma prece. Ah, e prece, do latim prex, significa “pedido, requerimento”.

Uma indicação é apontar ou assinalar, fazer uma recomendação ou prescrição, dar esclarecimento sobre. Portanto, uma indicação ou uma informação, com a mesma raíz latina, já que indicar” vem de in-, “em”, mais dicare, “proclamar, asseverar”, parente próximo de dicere [“dizer, falar, contar”], cujo antepassado é o mesmo, o indo-Europeu deik-, “indicar”.

Assim, não faço um pedido quando trato de esclarecer sobre um circuito ou um procedimento – dou indicação. Não faço um pedido para se cumprirem etapas regulamentadas – dou indicações. Não faço um pedido quando informo qual é a forma de avaliação – dou informação. Et voilá!

Anúncios

Oxford Dictionaries – Word of the Year 2017: youthquake

Em 2017, youthquake

As 2017 draws to a close, we turn to language to help us mark where we have been, how far we have come, and where we are heading. One word has been judged as not only reflective of the ethos, mood, or preoccupations of this past year, but as having lasting potential as a word of cultural significance. The Oxford Dictionaries Word of the Year 2017 is… youthquake.

The noun, youthquake, is defined as ‘a significant cultural, political, or social change arising from the actions or influence of young people’ – ‘uma mudança cultural, política ou social significativa decorrente das ações ou influência dos jovens “.

Curiosamente, além de ter sido título do 2º album dos Dead or Alive, o termo cunhou-se em 1965, como movimento jovem.

Portanto, a palavra do ano 2017, para o léxico Oxford, youthquake, terramoto da juventude,não é uma palavra nova (como aconteceu em 2016, com “post-truth”)mas uma retomada dos anos 60, na altura relacionada com o cenário da moda e da música.

palavras – integridade

do latim integritate,  significa a qualidade de alguém ou algo de ser íntegro, de conduta reta, pessoa de honra, brioso, pundonoroso.

De forma simples, a integridade é um conceito de consistência nas ações, nos valores, nos métodos, nas medidas, nos princípios.

Em ética, é entendida como honestidade, veracidade e rigor das ações. Uma virtude do sentido interior de «todo», de ser inteiro. Podemos referir a integridade moral, numa vida íntegra, assim como a integridade física ou dos bens sociais e individuais, integridade da honra e da fama, a integridade da intimidade pessoal, do nome, da imagem e dos sentimentos.

Na investigação científica a integridade reporta a valores fundamentais tais como a honestidade (quanto aos dados, resultados e processo de investigação), o rigor e transparência (explicitando as escolhas metodológicas, os processos), a confiança (nas garantias dos investigadores, como a confidencialidade), respeito(reconhecendo os contributos e colaborações, as autorias) e responsabilidade (assunção das obrigações dos investigadores e resposta pelos atos e consequências).  A comunidade científica estabeleceu mecanismos de controle da integridade do conhecimento gerado e das práticas de pesquisa – são  exemplos a avaliação por pares, a divulgação do conhecimento a publicação de artigos e livros, a apresentação de temas livres e de palestras em reuniões científicas.

E a integridade clínica – “Clinical integrity has two aspects. With respect to clinical practice, it requires health professionals to recognise when the expertise of other professionals should be sought. In the case of people with advanced chronic or terminal conditions, specialist palliative care will often be needed to keep people as free of pain and other suffering as is possible so that they can live well until they die. Secondly, with respect to personal integrity, it concerns both integrity in one’s personal character and consistency in one’s actions. In caring for people making the transition to end of life care, health professionals need to develop the skills required to facilitate the person’s journey through the maze of clinical and healthcare supports. Above all, clear communication with both the person and their other health professionals regarding the disease process, its likely trajectory and anticipated future needs is vital, as is the need for some health professionals to lead the collaboration about a person’s care.”  ethical framework

# palavras | estoicismo

Provavelmente, em 2018 devia desenvolver mais sentido estóico.

Stoicism is known as a eudaimonistic theory, which means that the culmination of human endeavor or ‘end’ (telos) is eudaimonia, meaning very roughly “happiness” or “flourishing.” The Stoics defined this end as “living in agreement with nature.” “Nature” is a complex and multivalent concept for the Stoics, and so their definition of the goal or final end of human striving is very rich.

The first sense of the definition is living in accordance with nature as a whole, i.e. the entire cosmos. (…)

Once a human being has developed reason, his function is to perform “appropriate acts” or “proper functions.” The Stoics defined an appropriate act as “that which reason persuades one to do” or “that which when done admits of reasonable justification.” Maintaining one’s health is given as an example. Since health is neither good nor bad in itself, but rather is capable of being used well or badly, opting to maintain one’s health by, say, walking, must harmonize with all other actions the agent performs. Similarly, sacrificing one’s property is an example of an act that is only appropriate under certain circumstances. The performance of appropriate acts is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition of virtuous action. This is because the agent must have the correct understanding of the actions he performs.(…)

The virtuous person is not passionless in the sense of being unfeeling like a statue. Rather, he mindfully distinguishes what makes a difference to his happiness—virtue and vice—from what does not. This firm and consistent understanding keeps the ups and downs of his life from spinning into the psychic disturbances or “pathologies” the Stoics understood passions to be.

Stoic Ethics, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

THE 9 PRINCIPLES TO KEEPING CALM IN THE STORM

1. Acknowledge that all emotions come from within

“Today I escaped anxiety. Or no, I discarded it, because it was within me, in my own perceptions — not outside.” — Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

2. Find someone you respect and use them to stay honest

“Choose someone whose way of life as well as words, and whose very face as mirroring the character that lies behind it, have won your approval. Be always pointing him out to yourself either as your guardian or as your model. This is a need, in my view, for someone as a standard against which our characters can measure themselves. Without a ruler to do it against you won’t make the crooked straight.” — Seneca, Letters From a Stoic

3. Recognize there is life after failure 

Does what’s happened to keep you from acting with justice, generosity, self-control, sanity, prudence, honesty, humility, straightforwardness, and all other qualities that allow a person’s nature to fulfill itself? So remember this principle when something threatens to cause you pain: the thing itself was no misfortune at all; to endure it and prevail is great good fortune.” — Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

Don’t just say you have read books. Show that through them you have learned to think better, to be a more discriminating and reflective person. Books are the training weights of the mind. They are very helpful, but it would be a bad mistake to suppose that one has made progress simply by having internalized their contents.” — Epictetus, The Art of Living

5. Challenge yourself to be brutally honest

“‘A consciousness of wrongdoing is the first step to salvation.’ This remark of Epicurus’ is to me a very good one. For a person who is not aware that he is doing anything wrong has no desire to be put right. You have to catch yourself doing it before you can reform. Some people boast about their failings: can you imagine someone who counts his faults as merits ever giving thought to their care? So—to the best of your ability—demonstrate your own guilt, conduct inquiries of your own into all the evidence against yourself. Play the first part of the prosecutor, then of the judge and finally of pleader in mitigation. Be harsh with yourself at times.” — Seneca, Letters From a Stoic

6. Reflect on what you spend the most time on

“A key point to bear in mind: The value of attentiveness varies in proportion to its object. You’re better off not giving the small things more time than they deserve.” — Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

7. Remind yourself: you weren’t meant to procrastinate.

“At dawn, when you have trouble getting out of bed, tell yourself: ‘I have to go to work—as a human being. What do I have to complain of, if I’m going to do what I was born for—the things I was brought into the world to do? Or is this what I was created for? To huddle under the blankets and stay warm?

– But it’s nicer here…

So you were born to feel ‘nice’? Instead of doings things and experiencing them? Don’t you see the plants, the birds, the ants and spiders and bees going about their individual tasks, putting the world in order, as best they can? And you’re not willing to do your job as a human being? Why aren’t you running to do what your nature demands? 

—But we have to sleep sometime…

Agreed. But nature set a limit on that—as it did on eating and drinking. And you’re over the limit. You’ve had more than enough of that. But not of working. There you’re still below your quota. You don’t love yourself enough. Or you’d love your nature too, and what it demands of you. People who love what they do wear themselves down doing it, they even forget to wash or eat. Do you have less respect for your own nature than the engraver does for engraving, the dancer for dance, the misery for money or the social climber for status? When they’re really possessed by what they do, they’d rather stop eating and sleeping than give up practicing their arts.” — Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

8. Put the phone away and be present

“Nothing, to my way of thinking, is a better proof of a well-ordered mind than a man’s ability to stop just where he is and pass some time in his own company.” — Seneca, Letters From a Stoic

9. Remind yourself that time is our most precious resource

“Not to live as if you had endless years ahead of you. Death overshadows you. While you’re alive and able — be good.” — Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

Space, placemaking and ownership

“Talk is mainly perceived as a phenomenon anchored in time. Temporality, sequentiality, segments, events, turns, and episodes: As these terms suggest, when people think of the conceptual categories of talk, they mainly think of time-based categories (Mehan, 1985 Mehan, H. (1985). The structure of classroom discourse. In T. A. Van Dijk (Ed.), Handbook of discourse analysis (Vol. 3, pp. 115–131). London, UK: Academic Press. [Google Scholar]). The literature on talk in learning discussions has not given sufficient consideration to the notions of space and place and has not sufficiently differentiated between time and space.

Space is a leading metaphor in the learning sciences. Following Bakhtin (1981 Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). The dialogic imagination. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. [Google Scholar]), Wegerif (2007 Wegerif, R. (2007). Dialogic, educational and technology: Expanding the space of learning. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.[Crossref][Google Scholar]) used the term dialogical space; Erduran, Simon, and Osborne (2004 Erduran, S., Simon, S., & Osborne, J. (2004). Tapping into argumentation: Developments in the application of Toulmin’s argument pattern for studying science discourse. Science Education, 88(6), 915933. doi:10.1002/(ISSN)1098-237X[Crossref], [Web of Science ®][Google Scholar]) used the term argumentative space; Mercer and Littleton (2007 Mercer, N., & Littleton, K. (2007). Dialogue and the development of children’s thinking: A sociocultural approach. London, UK: Routledge. [Google Scholar]) used the intersubjective space; Chin and Osborne (2010 Chin, C., & Osborne, J. (2010). Supporting argumentation through students’ questions: Case studies in science classrooms. Journal of the Learning Sciences, 19(2), 230284. doi:10.1080/10508400903530036[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®][Google Scholar]) used the terms questioning space and negotiation space; and Schwarz and Asterhan (2011 Schwarz, B. B., & Asterhan, C. S. C. (2011). E-moderation of synchronous discussions in educational settings: A nascent practice. Journal of the Learning Sciences, 20(3), 395442. doi:10.1080/10508406.2011.553257[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®][Google Scholar]) used the term discussion space. The literature is replete with the term space, yet its definition needs to be clarified.

The term space has historically held multiple, sometimes contradictory, meanings. For the atomists, space was the place of the void in which the atoms move and collide (Berryman, 2010 Berryman, S. (2010). Democritus. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democritus/in [Google Scholar]). Space was perceived as infinite, as is the quantity of atoms. This dual infinity is the mechanism behind the possibility of movement. In Aristotle’s Physics, place rather than space functioned as the actual container of the thing. Despite this difference, both Aristotle and Democritus perceived space and place as ontologically substantive. It was only later, first in Theophrastus’s Physics and then in Leibniz’s writings, that space was understood as an organizational order projected on reality by the subject (Casey, 1997 Casey, E. S. (1997). The fate of place: A philosophical history. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [Google Scholar]). This view was more fully articulated in Kant’s account of space as a transcendental intuition that basically constitutes the mind.

In his seminal work The Production of Space, Lefebvre (1967/1991 Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. (Original work published 1967) [Google Scholar]) highlighted the importance of studying space as a specific, socially produced order that results from human activity. From this standpoint, space is the outcome of interactions, and the ideational aspect of space—the concrete concept of the space people have—follows and mirrors material relations. Mondada (2013 Mondada, L. (2013). Interactional space and the study of embodied talk-in-interaction. In P. Auer, M. Hilpert, A. Stukenbrock, & B. Szmrecsanyi (Eds.), Space in language and linguistics: Geographical, interactional and cognitive perspectives (pp. 247275). Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.[Crossref][Google Scholar]) relied on Goffman’s (1961 Goffman, E. (1961). Encounters: Two studies in the sociology of interaction. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. [Google Scholar]) idea of a “situated activity system” to elaborate the notion of interactional space in face-to-face talk:

The interactional space is constituted through the situated, mutually adjusted changing arrangements of the participants’ bodies within space, as they are made relevant by the activity they are engaged in, their mutual attention and their common focus of attention, the objects they manipulate and the way in which they coordinate in joint action. (Mondada, 2013 Mondada, L. (2013). Interactional space and the study of embodied talk-in-interaction. In P. Auer, M. Hilpert, A. Stukenbrock, & B. Szmrecsanyi (Eds.), Space in language and linguistics: Geographical, interactional and cognitive perspectives (pp. 247275). Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.[Crossref][Google Scholar], p. 250)

This interactional space is constantly being (re)established and transformed within the activity. The notion of interactional space is intended to contribute both to an interactional conceptualization of space and to a spatial conceptualization of interaction. In her research program, Mondada relates her approach to space to the sequential and temporal organization of talk and embodied action in order to show how interactional space unfolds moment by moment within the coordinated adjustment of various simultaneous streams of action and sets of multimodal resources.”

(…)

“Although Lefebvre’s ideas about socially produced spaces were not generated within the discipline of geography, they resemble its accepted definition for place (Tuan, 1977 Tuan, Y. F. (1977). Space and place: The perspective of experience. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. [Google Scholar]). His distinction between space and place draws on their dialectical relations; people tend to think about one in the light of the other: Whereas space is general, place is personal and implies a sense of belonging. Space signals movement, whereas place is a site of stability and immobility.

Space could turn into place as a result of actions that transpire within it in a process of placemaking: “the set of social, political and material processes by which people iteratively create and recreate the experienced geographies in which they live” (Pierce, Martin, & Murphy, 2011 Pierce, J., Martin, D. B., & Murphy, J. T. (2011). Relational place-making: The networked politics of place. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 36(1), 5470. doi:10.1111/j.1475-5661.2010.00411.x[Crossref], [Web of Science ®][Google Scholar], p. 54). Places, then, are sites of history and identity. In order for a place to become a meaningful location, it has to be subject to human relations; it has to absorb a degree of agency, including emotions (Agnew, 1987 Agnew, J. (1987). The United States in world economy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]). Placemaking actions are manifestations of agency. They are attempts to assert identity or to localize—personalize or socialize—space (Creswell, 2004 Creswell, T. (2004). Space: A short introduction. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. [Google Scholar]). Respectively, the private and the public, the two pillars of political philosophy, are both places; a great deal of agency is invested in them.

The relation between placemaking and political becoming is mediated through the notion of ownership. Placemaking implies a growing sense of ownership toward the transformed site. Ownership is sensed in two ways: through the iterative actions needed in order to turn space into place and through projecting ownership objects and ownership signifiers, also known as self-directed identity claims (Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002 Gosling, S., Ko, S. J., Mannarelli, T., & Morris, M. E. (2002). A room with a que: Personality judgments based on offices and bedrooms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(3), 379398. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.82.3.379[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®][Google Scholar]), on space and reclaiming it in this way. For example, with regard to a street, ownership could be sensed by fencing off part of it and putting up a sign with a family’s name, which might even lead to the action-invested place being treated as home. Later in this article, we develop the connection between placemaking and political agency.

This idea of ownership is in close accordance with Aristotle’s notion of having. In his Metaphysics (Delta), Aristotle (1971 Aristotle. (1971). Metaphysics (Books Gamma, Delta and Epsilon). Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. [Google Scholar]) defined possession as a mediated act (praxis) or movement between the proprietor and the thing. The Greek word for possession is hexis. The word can also be described as a qualification that originates from practice and habituation. The physical dimension of the process of hexis is reflected in the Latin translation of the concept, the habitus, these days so familiarly associated with Bourdieu (1977/2013 Bourdieu, P. (2013). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1977) [Google Scholar]). The habitus refers not only to the process of acquiring through recurrence, or to the habitual aspect of being accustomed to performing an action, but also to the growing capability, readiness, and ease in performing the act in similar—yet changed—environments. The experience of ownership is then the cumulative outcome of recurring bodily practices of spatial actions. The knowledge produced in the process of having is localized and privatized.

This relation between recursive actions and political development in Aristotle’s ethical philosophy should be emphasized. The hexis, because of its habitual and bodily nature, is the cornerstone of Aristotle’s ethical virtue. Unlike the intellectual, the ethical virtue can be neither appropriated through direct teaching nor developed naturally in man; its development is the outcome of reclusiveness, of habit (ethos): “The only way to have (virtue) is to do right … we become just by doing just acts” (Aristotle, 1999a Aristotle. (1999a). Nicomachean ethics. Retrieved from http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html [Google Scholar], Book 2, p. 21, emphasis added). Hence the crucial importance of developing good practices at a young age: “It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference” (p. 21).”

“Wherever You Go, You Will Be a Polis”: Spatial Practices and Political Education in Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning Discussions.  Journal of the Learning Sciences Vol. 26 , Iss. 2,2017

 

 

# palavras | intencionalidade

Intencionalidade,

“é a propriedade de muitos estados e eventos mentais pela qual eles são dirigidos para ou acerca de objectos e estados de coisas no mundo. Se, por exemplo, tenho uma crença, deve ser uma crença de que tal ou qual coisa é o caso; se tenho um medo, deve ser um medo de algo ou de que algo vai acontecer; se tenho um desejo, deve ser um desejo de fazer algo ou de que algo aconteça ou seja o caso; se tenho uma intenção, deve ser uma intenção de fazer algo. (…) Mas, em muitos aspectos, o termo é equívoco(…). Por isso quero já de início clarificar o modo como tenciono usá-lo.

Em primeiro lugar, na minha concepção, só alguns e não todos estados e eventos mentais têm Intencionalidade. Crenças, medos, esperanças e desejos são Intencionais; mas há formas de nervosismo, exaltação e ansiedade não direccionada que não são Intencionais. (…) As minhas crenças e desejos têm sempre que ser acerca de alguma coisa. Mas o meu nervosismo e ansiedade não dirigida não precisam de ser acerca de algo. Tais estados são caracteristicamente acompanhados por crenças e desejos, mas estados não dirigidos não são idênticos a crenças ou desejos. (…)

Em segundo lugar, Intencionalidade não é o mesmo que consciência. Muitos estados conscientes não são Intencionais, como uma sensação súbita de exaltação, e muitos estados Intencionais não são conscientes, como eu ter muitas crenças sobre as quais não estou a pensar no presente e nas quais posso nunca ter pensado (…), são apenas crenças que se têm e nas quais, normalmente, não se pensa.

Em terceiro lugar, tencionar e intenções são apenas uma forma entre outras de Intencionalidade; não têm qualquer estatuto especial. O trocadilho óbvio entre “Intencionalidade” e “intenção” sugere que, no sentido comum do termo, as intenções têm algum papel especial na teoria da Intencionalidade; mas, na minha abordagem, tencionar fazer algo é apenas uma forma de Intencionalidade, juntamente com crença, esperança, medo, desejo, e muitas outras; e não quero com isto sugerir que, por as crenças, por exemplo, serem Intencionais, contenham de alguma maneira a noção de intenção ou tencionem algo, ou que alguém que tenha uma crença deva por meio dela tencionar fazer algo acerca dela. (…) Intencionalidade é direccionalidade; tencionar fazer algo é apenas um tipo de Intencionalidade entre outros.

SEARLE, John, Intencionalidade – um ensaio de filosofia da mente, 1999. Lisboa: Relógio D’Água Editores, pp.21-23

The root of the word ‘intentionality’ reflects the notion that it expresses, deriving from the Latin intentio, meaning ‘directed at’.

IEP

 

 

# palavras | Big Data

  • Extremely large data sets that may be analysed computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, especially relating to human behaviour and interactions.

    [Oxford Dictionary]

    The definition of big data refers to groups of data that are so large and unwieldy that regular database management tools have difficulty capturing, storing, sharing and managing the information.
    [Your Dictionary.com]

    conjuntos de dados extremamente amplos e que necessitam de ferramentas especialmente preparadas para lidar com grandes volumes, de forma a que toda e qualquer informação possa ser encontrada, analisada e aproveitada em tempo útil.

  • “The term Big Data, which spans computer science and statistics/econometrics, probably originated in the lunch-table conversations at Silicon Graphics in the mid-1990s, in which John Mashey figured prominently.”]
  • 2000, economista Francis X. Diebold publicou a 1ª versão de um artigo: “Big Data Dynamic Factor Models for Macroeconomic Measurement and Forecasting.”
  • articulado em 2001 por Doug Laney, com os três Vs: Volume, Velocidade, Variedade,

    tendo estes fatores aumentado posteriormente para 5 V’s – com Veracidade e Valor.

    A ler:

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